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Art, contemplation and intellectus 
Aquinas and Gadamer in conversation 
Rik Van Nieuwenhove 
 
Introduction: exploring the possibilities of a dialogue between 
Aquinas and Gadamer 
The main theme of this book can be situated broadly on the crossroads 
between mystical theology and art. Contemplation, which is the topic of this 
contribution, lies at the very core of this interface. I will make this point by 
considering the Thomist notion of contemplatio, and bring it into dialogue 
with Gadamer’s hermeneutical project, and his views on art in particular (as 
developed in the first part of Truth and Method and in his short treatise The 
Relevance of the Beautiful). 
One may wonder, however, whether bringing Gadamer in conversation with 
Aquinas is actually a meaningful venture. As is well known, many scholars 
(e.g., Johannes Lotz, Bertrand Rioux, Gustave Siewerth, Max Müller, John 
Caputo, Jean-Luc Marion, amongst others) have engaged Aquinas in dialogue 
with Heidegger, and have addressed the question of whether Aquinas is 
vulnerable to Heidegger’s critique of Seinsvergessenheit (forgetfulness of 
being) in particular.1 The discussion seems to have abated somewhat and this 
may very well be a welcome development.2 In my view, a more interesting 
dialogue could indeed be engendered between Aquinas and Heidegger’s pupil,  
Hans-Georg Gadamer. Admittedly, while both Aquinas and Gadamer are 
sensitive to the manner in which our thinking is shaped by traditions that 
precede us, some might doubt whether Aquinas’s philosophy can be squared 
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with Gadamer’s historicist and contextual perspective. This is a complex 
issue, if only because it hinges on the extent to which we are willing to 
consider Gadamer a realist thinker who makes truth-claims which, no matter 
how contextualised, nonetheless transcend a particular perspective, and claim 
universal validity. For all his critique of foundationalism and rational 
autonomy, and his emphasis upon the contextuality and linguistic nature of 
human understanding, Gadamer does subscribe to a realist position. In the 
words of Brice Wachterhauser: ‘We simply cannot make sense of human 
knowledge in all of its relativity to this historically conditioned, linguistically 
constituted, value-laden standpoints, if we do not see these standpoints as in 
principle compatible with and in contact with the intelligibility of the world’.3 
Thus, Gadamer is committed to metaphysical views that assume the inherent 
intelligibility of our world and language. The perspectivist and linguistically 
and tradition-conditioned outlook of his philosophical stance does not exclude 
the possibility of a realist position in which we can make claims of universal 
intent about our world. 
Gadamer’s critique of the Enlightenment project, its alleged 
‘presuppositionless’ stance and the distancing from, or even disparagement of, 
the tradition that it implies, and its problematic preoccupation with positivistic  
methodology not only place him in the company of postmodern thinkers but 
also allow us to bring him into dialogue with pre-modern thinkers, such as 
Aquinas, who is obviously free from these Enlightenment presuppositions. 
Incidentally, while a dialogue between Gadamer and post-modern thought has 
proven to be a venture which has met with rather mixed success, an 
engagement with pre-modern thinkers, such as Aquinas, may yield more 
positive results – which is perhaps not all that surprising given the 
indebtedness of both Aquinas and Gadamer to the classical Greek tradition.4 
Scholars who have brought Aquinas in dialogue with Gadamer have mainly 
focused on how Gadamer draws on Aquinas’s theology of the Trinity to 
address the issue of the forgetfulness of language (cf. the work of John Arthos 
and David Vessey).5 More specifically, in the section ‘Language and verbum’ 
from Truth and Method, Gadamer engages with the Trinitarian thought of 
Augustine and Aquinas as instances of authors who are not guilty of the so-
called forgetfulness of language he attributes to Plato and the ensuing 
tradition.6 Gadamer takes issue with the Western way of thinking in which (as 
he sees it) words are mere signs, and no longer eikons. The views of Augustine 
and Aquinas, on the other hand, make clear the intimate link between thought 
and language: as the verbum or Word is begotten from the Father, so too our 
language expresses our thought. The Christian notion of the Incarnation, 
which itself must be understood in light of the generation of the inner Word 
from the Father, challenges the notion of the word as a mere sign of things.7 
While Gadamer’s explicit engagement with Aquinas’s theology of the 
generation of the Word offers a foothold for dialogue between the two 
thinkers, a whole range of other topics could also be fruitfully examined. 
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When developing his hermeneutical project Gadamer goes in search of non-
modern ways of understanding, which might offer a more hospitable source 
for the event of understanding as it occurs in the humanities. One of the key 
sources here is Aristotle’s notion of practical wisdom (phronesis). As is well 
known, phronesis or prudentia occupies a central role in Gadamer’s 
hermeneutical project (which centres on discovering truth in human 
historicity) – but it is also of central concern to Aquinas’s project, especially 
in the Second Part of the Summa Theologiae (ST). Another possible avenue 
of research is the exploration of the role of species in Aquinas and language 
in Gadamer as that through which we understand the world. There is also 
Gadamer’s discussion of the transcendentals in the last part of Truth and 
Method – a part of his writing that has received little scholarly attention.  In 
this chapter, however, I will limit myself to some introductory remarks on the 
intellective nature of contemplatio, as Aquinas characterises it, and bring this 
into dialogue with Gadamer’s views on art and hermeneutics. 
1) Aquinas on the beautiful, intellectus and contemplation 
Although, admittedly, Aquinas has fairly little to say on art and aesthetics, a 
conversation between Aquinas and Gadamer on beauty and contemplation 
actually benefits from the fact that Aquinas is writing at a time when aesthetics 
had not yet grown into an autonomous philosophical discipline. Gadamer 
considers the very coming into existence of aesthetics in the eighteenth 
century an indication of the subjectivisation and ‘differentiation’ of aesthetics 
– an evolution which he deplores.8 
For Aquinas, therefore, aesthetics is still deeply embedded into a 
metaphysical framework. This can be illustrated by ST I, q.5, a.4 ad 1. The 
article deals with the question whether goodness is to be associated with final 
causality. Aquinas prefers to associate goodness with final causality (as that 
which draws us), and beauty with formal causality. The latter connection is 
not surprising. In Latin forma (the form or essence of a thing) and formosus 
(beautiful) are closely related.9 One objection, however, quotes The Divine 
Names ch. IV by Pseudo-Dionysius who had associated goodness with beauty, 
and hence suggests that goodness is connected with formal rather than final 
causality. Aquinas replies: 
Beauty and goodness in a thing are identical fundamentally; for they are 
based upon the same thing, namely, the form; and consequently goodness 
is praised as beauty. But they differ logically, for goodness properly 
belongs to the appetite (goodness being what all things desire); and 
therefore it has the aspect of an end (the appetite being a kind of 
movement towards a thing). On the other hand, beauty relates to the 
cognitive faculty; for beautiful things are those which please when seen. 
(Pulchrum autem respicit vim cognoscitivam, pulchra enim dicuntur quae 
visa placent). Hence beauty consists in due proportion; for the senses 
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delight in things duly proportioned, as in what is after their own kind – 
because even sense is a sort of reason (nam et sensus ratio quaedam est), 
just as is every cognitive faculty. Now since knowledge is by assimilation,  
and similarity relates to form, beauty properly belongs to the nature of a 
formal cause.10 
In this quotation Aquinas first acknowledges that beauty and goodness are 
both based on the form of things, which is why Pseudo-Dionysius associates 
goodness with beauty. This explains, for instance, why we call virtues 
beautiful (e.g., ‘Honesty is a beautiful trait’). However, there is a difference: 
goodness is associated with final causality (what we desire), while we simply 
delight in things of beauty we apprehend. Each thing has its form, which is 
characterised by due proportion or harmony, as well as clarity and integrity or 
perfection.11 We should not take these characteristics in too literal or 
straightforward a manner. For instance, when Aquinas mentions claritas he 
has more in mind than simply brightness. He means something more profound 
and more ontological: the form is that through which each thing radiates and 
displays its inherent splendour as a created thing. Indeed, its beauty ultimately 
participates in the beauty of God himself.12 Associating beauty and goodness 
with formal and final causality respectively seems reasonable: when 
contemplating the inner splendour of a thing of beauty we do not necessarily 
aim to possess it. There is an element of gratuity in our encounter with beauty 
which is absent from our attraction towards goodness.  
The quotation illustrates that Aquinas emphasises the cognitive aspect of 
beauty as that which pleases when apprehended.13 This is in marked contrast 
to later modern subjectivist and experientialist understandings of art (what 
Gadamer calls Erlebniskunst). Given the fact that the beautiful is subsumed in 
goodness and that truth (the object of intellect) and goodness (the object of 
the appetitive power) inhere in one another, Aquinas is happy to attribute a 
cognitive dimension to the contemplation of beauty:14 
The beautiful is the same as the good, and they differ in aspect only. For 
since good is what all seek, the notion of good is that which calms the 
desire; while the notion of the beautiful is that which calms the desire, by 
being seen or known (quod in eius aspectu seu cognitione quietur 
appetitus). Consequently those senses chiefly regard the beautiful, which 
are the most cognitive, namely, sight and hearing, as ministering to 
reason; for we speak of beautiful sights and beautiful sounds. [. . .] Thus 
it is evident that beauty adds to goodness a relation to the cognitive 
faculty.15 
In the encounter with beauty intellect and will co-inhere in the contemplative 
act. Gazing at things of beauty constitutes a privileged form of contemplation: 
just as the beatific vision culminates in delight, so does the apprehension of a 
thing of beauty. Although Aquinas never states it explicitly, I do not think that 
the claim that contemplation extends to the realm of aesthetics as well, 
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especially to things of visual and auditory beauty (music, poetry), is at odds 
with the central insights of Thomism. After all, truth (the object of intellect) 
and goodness (the object of the appetitive power) mutually include each other: 
‘Truth is something good, otherwise it would not be desirable; and good is 
something true, otherwise it would not be intelligible’.16 While things of 
beauty offer a medium of contemplation insofar as they are goodness that can 
be seen or apprehended, Aquinas further claims that a life of contemplation 
can be called beautiful in its own right. In ST II – II, q.180, a. 2 ad 3 he explains 
that there is beauty in the contemplative life because the very operation of our 
intellectual faculties in our encounter with beauty is essential in disclosing the 
clarity and due proportion that characterises it.17 
Although it must be admitted that Aquinas does not treat beauty extensively,  
and the contemplation of things beautiful even less so, there are sufficient 
points of convergence between his intellective notion of contemplation and 
Gadamer’s non-subjectivist notion of art as event which discloses truth to 
generate a dialogue between our two authors. I will now discuss Aquinas’s 
views on contemplation and intellectus before returning to Gadamer. 
Aquinas, following his sources in Boethius and Pseudo-Dionysius, 
distinguishes between two acts of the one power of understanding, namely 
ratio (discursive reasoning) and intellectus (intellect or understanding): 
Reason and intellect in man cannot be distinct powers. We shall 
understand this clearly if we consider their respective actions. For to 
understand is simply to apprehend intelligible truth: and to reason is to 
advance from one thing understood to another, so as to know an 
intelligible truth. And therefore angels, who according to their nature, 
possess perfect knowledge of intelligible truth, have no need to advance 
from one thing to another; but they apprehend the truth simply and 
without mental discursion, as Pseudo-Dionysius says (Div. Nom. VII). 
But man arrives at the knowledge of intelligible truth by advancing from 
one thing to another; and therefore he is called rational. Reasoning, 
therefore, is compared to understanding, as movement is to rest, or 
acquisition to possession; of which one belongs to the perfect, the other 
to the imperfect.18 
As I have tried to show elsewhere, when making the distinction between 
intellectus and ratio, which is central to his notion of contemplation as intuitus 
simplex, Aquinas invariably draws on the writings of Pseudo-Dionysius and 
Boethius, and does not refer to Aristotle.19 Within the confines of this 
contribution it may suffice to say that the act of intellectus is to apprehend 
intelligible truth, whereas to reason is discursive, i.e., it involves movement 
and a reasoning process, so as to come to know an intelligible truth. For this 
reason, Aquinas compares reasoning to movement and understanding to rest 
or possession.20 A reasoning process, if successful, culminates in the moment 
of insight, ‘when the penny drops’, in colloquial English. Those moments of 
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insight are a dimension of intellect (intellectus), not reason. Again, reason can 
only begin to operate in light of certain truths which it simply accepts but 
cannot argue for in a discursive manner. For instance, the principle of non-
contradiction, a key axiom in traditional logic, is a truth which we can perceive 
in an intellective manner, not in a rational manner. Human reason or ratio thus 
operates against an intellective horizon, and is quite literally unthinkable 
without it.21 It has a self-transcendent dynamic to it, and is surrounded by 
truths which we can perceive or see in an intellective or, if you like, intuitive 
manner, without discursive reasoning or analysis. The very fact that we speak, 
in English, of ‘insight’ (German: Einsicht; Dutch: Inzicht), alludes to the fact 
that the intellect can simply see or perceive things.  
It is important to note that it is not simply the case that ratio needs the 
insight of intellectus to generate the reasoning process; nor is it simply the 
case that this reasoning process finally results in a moment of intellective 
insight. Rather, the process of human understanding implies a to-and-fro 
movement of insight and reasoning.22 In other words, when we are engaged 
in profound intellectual activity, struggling, for instance, to interpret a text or 
solve a theoretical problem, there will be a to-and-fro movement between 
intellective insight and searching, discursive reason. This dynamic at the heart 
of intellect and reason coheres well with Gadamer’s analysis of interpreting 
the art-work as play, characterised by a similar to-and-fro movement, as we 
will see. 
Now, contemplation is deeply intellective as distinct from rational-
discursive. When contemplating, discursive reasoning must be put aside and 
the gaze of the soul must be fixed on the contemplation of the one simple 
truth.23 In his early III Sent. d.35 q.1, a.2 qc. 2 Aquinas spells out the 
significance of a simple, intellective grasp for contemplation in greater detail: 
The contemplative life consists in the activity that one assumes (acceptat) 
above all others. [. . .] Now, the inquiry of reason (inquisitio rationis) 
proceeds from a simple regard of the intellect (a simplici intuitu 
intellectus progreditur) – for one proceeds by starting out from principles 
which the intellect holds; so too the intellect attains certainty when the 
conclusions it draws can revert back to the principles through which the 
intellect attained certainty. This is why the contemplative life consists 
primarily in the operation of the intellect (Et ideo vita contemplativa 
principaliter in operatione intellectus consistit): the very word 
‘contemplation’ suggests this as it denotes ‘vision.’ The contemplative 
person, however, uses rational inquiry (inquisitione rationis) so as to 
attain the vision of contemplation, which is his main goal.  
As this quotation suggests, Aquinas associates contemplation proper with an 
intellective ‘simple regard’, gaze (intuitus), or vision, which is ultimately non-
discursive. While contemplation in the strict sense is clearly intellective, it 
does involve, for human beings, a rational-discursive process (as the last 
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sentence of the quotation suggests). It is the specifically intellec tive aspect 
(actus intellectus) – as distinct from the rational-discursive dimension (actus 
rationis) – which is characteristic of contemplation: ‘according to the 
Philosopher in Bk X of his Ethics we share the contemplative life with God. 
Now, we do not share with God discursive reasoning (inquisitio rationis) but 
rather the insight of intellect (intuitus intellectus)’.25 Or again: ‘Contemplation 
consists in the simple gaze of the intellect upon a truth (contemplatio pertinet 
ad ipsum simplicem intuitum veritatis)’.26 Thus, when contemplating, 
discursive reasoning must be put aside and the gaze (intuitus) of the soul must 
be fixed on the contemplation of the one simple truth.27 The claims that there 
is an intellective dimension to human understanding (rather than a merely 
rational-discursive one), which we share, to some extent, with higher 
intelligences, and, secondly, that it is this intellective dimension, understood 
as a simple gazing on the truth, which he considers to be the characteristic 
feature of contemplation, were to be Aquinas’s constant teaching until the end 
of his life. 
The contrast between discursivity of ratio and restfulness of intellectus 
suggests that contemplation is also beyond ordinary time marked by 
discursiveness and succession.28 Contemplation is further characterised by a 
purely receptive approach to reality, disinterested and independent of all 
practical aims of the active life. It is pursued for its own sake (contemplatio 
maxime quaeritur propter seipsam) and is not subject to any other goal.29 It 
consists in ‘a certain liberty of mind (libertas animi)’, in ‘leisure and rest’.30 
Given these features it is not surprising that Aquinas explicitly associates 
contemplation with play (which is pursued for its own sake) and feasting. 31 In 
Sent. I, d.2 q.1, a.5 Expos. Aquinas alludes to this connection between 
contemplation and play: ‘Because of the leisure of contemplation (otium 
contemplationis) the Scripture says of the divine Wisdom itself that it plays 
all the time, plays throughout the world’ (Prov. 8:30). Similarly, in his 
Prologue to his Commentary on Boethius’s De Hebdomadibus he writes: 
There are two features of play which make it appropriate to compare the 
contemplation of wisdom to playing. First, we enjoy playing, and there is 
the greatest enjoyment of all to be had in the contemplation of wisdom. 
As Wisdom says in Ecclesiasticus 24:27, ‘My spirit is sweeter than 
honey’. Secondly, playing has no purpose beyond itself; what we do is 
done for its own sake. And the same applies to the pleasure of wisdom. 
Let us summarise our discussion of Aquinas: first, I suggested that things of 
beauty can act as a privileged medium for contemplation, given the fact that 
beauty is goodness which can be apprehended or beheld; there is a cognitive 
dimension to things of beauty. I then drew attention to the distinction between 
ratio and intellectus. The former is discursive, while intellectus is more 
intuitive, an immediate apprehension of truth. I made the point that 
contemplation, as Aquinas sees it, is predominantly intellective, although the 
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intellective insight always presupposes discursive reasoning, as well as a 
return to the phantasmata and the senses (a topic I cannot develop here).32 So 
there is a dialectical relation between discursive reasoning, and intellective 
insight, generating a to-and-fro movement between reasoning and insight. I 
further pointed out that contemplation, in its intellective dimension, is beyond 
ordinary time (the flash of insight), and intuitive and synthetic (you grasp 
something as a meaningful and coherent whole in one single apprehension). 
It is also being pursued for its own sake, in contrast to the active life. I will 
now discuss Gadamer’s views on theoria and art as play, symbol and festival. 
2) Gadamer on art and theoria 
As is well known, one of the central concerns of Gadamer’s writings is the 
legitimacy and integrity of understanding as it takes place in the humanities. 
It is this concern that drives his hermeneutical project, and is the foundation 
for its claims of universality: when interpreting ‘texts’ (in the broad sense of 
the word) we engage in understanding. 
Understanding is deeply dialogical for Gadamer – in the first place it 
implies a dialogue between the reader and the text; but the reader or interpreter 
herself is in conversation with tradition(s) and pre-understandings, which do 
not hinder interpretation but rather render it possible.33 In his work, The 
Relevance of the Beautiful, Gadamer refers to the phenomena of play, symbol 
and festivity so as to illuminate the ontological nature of art. As hinted at 
earlier, for Gadamer this is part of a broader project: his aim is to show that 
the subjectivisation of art, in which art is reduced to some variety of personal 
experience, is an unwelcome reductionism. Drawing on Heidegger, Gadamer 
argues that the work of art is an event which discloses truth. Therefore, art 
should not be primarily understood in terms of feelings or personal experience 
but rather in terms of what the art work as an event is able to disclose – and 
disclosure or bringing out of concealment is what truth does for Heidegger. 34 
This discussion of art as an event of truth assists Gadamer in safeguarding the 
integrity of the humanities in an intellectual climate which has largely 
succumbed to a positivistic methodology (‘social sciences’). The experience 
of art, so Gadamer argues, contains a claim to truth which is different from 
that of science, but is not inferior to it. Because there is  specific truth in art, 
he can further claim that the mode of being of the work of art can assist us in 
revealing the nature of understanding in general, which is an essential aspect 
of his overall hermeneutical project. I hope to suggest that Gadamer’s 
reference to art as play, symbol and festival complements and coheres well 
with our previous outline of what Aquinas has to say on the nature of 
contemplation. 
3) Art as play, symbol and festival 
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Gadamer identifies a number of characteristics of play. First,  it is dynamic, 
full of inner movement and tension. Gadamer mentions the to-and-fro of 
constantly repeated movement in play (e.g., a child bouncing a ball), or the 
ebbing and flowing of a competitive game of football. This proves a 
significant analogy, not just in relation to the piece of art itself but also in 
relation to the nature of interpretation. After all, interpretation for Gadamer is 
always dialogical in character, as a process in which truth arises in the to-and-
fro of question and response. 
Secondly, play is characterised by a non-purposive rationality: when 
playing, we engage in an activity for its own sake, which has its own set of 
rules and logic. Thus, the game masters the players. What Gadamer means by 
this is that the real subject of the game is not the player but the play itself.35 
Play invites spectators to participate, ‘to play along’ because we are captured 
by what is intended in the game, ‘even if it is not something conceptual, useful, 
or purposive’. In contrast to ‘the subjective turn in aesthetics’ which he 
associates especially with Kant, Gadamer wants to focus on ‘the mode of 
being of the work of art itself’.36 Play contains its own sacred seriousness, and 
somebody who does not take the game seriously is a spoilsport. So play only 
fulfils its purpose if the player loses himself in play. There is therefore an 
important element of self-forgetfulness in play, and I will return to this 
momentarily. Play demands our undivided attention and commitment for the 
very reason that we merely participate in an event of play which has primacy 
over the consciousness of the players. As Gadamer states in Truth and Method: 
‘The structure of play absorbs the player into itself, and thus frees him from 
the burden of taking the initiative [. . .] The real subject of the game [. . .] is 
not the player but instead the game itself. What holds the player in its spell, 
draws him into play, and keeps him there is the game itself’.37 In other words: 
the player experiences the game as a reality that surpasses her.38 The players 
are not the subjects of play but play itself reaches presentation (Darstellung) 
through the players. 
Having developed the analogy of play to uncover the ontology of the work 
of art, Gadamer examines art as ‘symbol’. He reminds us that a symbol 
originally referred to tessera hospitalis, an object broken in two, whereby one 
was kept by one person, and the other half was given to a guest or friend. A 
descendant of the guest could enter the house, and the two pieces could be 
fitted together again to form a whole in an act of recognition.39 Thus, the 
element of recognition is essential: the symbol is ‘that other fragment that has 
always been sought in order to complete and make whole our own 
fragmentary life’.40 Insofar as it is symbolic, art is ‘the invocation of a 
potentially whole and holy order of things’. In our encounter with art our 
ontological place in the world, and our finitude before that which transcends 
us, is revealed.41 
Against Hegel, Gadamer asserts that the meaning that is revealed can never 
be fully grasped in concepts or knowledge. Following Heidegger’s  
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alethiological understanding of truth, Gadamer further claims that art does not 
simply reveal but conceals as well.42 In Gadamer’s view, this is due to our 
finitude, which precludes a reductionism of the ‘ontological fullness’ of the 
artistic creation to graspable meaning: ‘The symbolic does not simply point 
toward a meaning but rather allows that meaning to present itself’.43 It 
‘represents’, i.e., it makes present again. Insofar as it is symbolic, art is ‘the 
invocation of a potentially whole and holy order of things’. 
Thirdly, Gadamer’s discussion of art as festival is particularly relevant in 
relation to the issue of temporality. During the celebration of festivals time is 
‘fulfilled’ or autonomous. We cease to calculate time in terms of weeks and 
months which are to be ‘filled’ with something, lest we have nothing to do. 
Like a festival, the work of art ‘proffers time, arresting it and allowing it to 
tarry. [. . .] The calculating way in which we normally manage and dispose of 
our time is, as it were, brought to a standstill’.44 Or as he puts it in a 
conversation with Carsten Dutt: 
The Weile [the ‘while’ in Verweilen, tarrying] has this very special 
temporal structure – a temporal structure of being moved, which one 
nevertheless cannot describe merely as duration, because duration means 
only further movement in a single direction. This is not what is 
determinative in the experience of art. In it we tarry, we remain with the 
art structure [Kunstgebilde], which as a whole then becomes ever richer 
and more diverse [. . . W]e learn from the work of art to tarry.45 
While the purpose of Gadamer’s discussion of art in terms of play, symbol 
and festival is to resist an experientialist subjectivised interpretation of art he 
does acknowledge that the human subject requires a certain disposition, which 
we can best characterise as self-forgetful contemplation: 
We started by saying that the true being of the spectator, who belongs to 
the play of art, cannot be adequately understood in terms of subjectivity, 
as a way that aesthetic consciousness conducts itself. But this does not 
mean that the nature of the spectator cannot be described in terms of being 
present at something, in the way we pointed out. Considered as a 
subjective accomplishment in human conduct, being present has the 
character of being outside of oneself. [.  . . [B]eing outside of oneself is 
the positive possibility of being wholly with something else. This kind of 
being present is a self-forgetfulness (Solches Dabeisein hat den Charakter 
der Selbstvergessenheit), and to be a spectator consists in giving oneself 
in self-forgetfulness to what one is watching. Here self-forgetfulness is 
anything but a privative condition, for it arises from devoting one’s full 
attention to the matter at hand, and this is the spectator’s own positive 
accomplishment.46 
Gadamer links self-forgetfulness with contemplation, Θεωρία (the Greek 
equivalent of contemplatio; it is derived from the Greek verb theorein, 
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meaning ‘to contemplate’ or ‘to gaze’) and even ekstasis. He makes the point 
that theoria is not to be conceived primarily as ‘subjective conduct, as a self-
determination of the subject, but in terms of what it is contemplating. Theoria 
is not something active but something passive (pathos), namely being totally 
involved in and carried away by what one sees’.47 He further argues that self-
forgetfulness, necessary to appreciate the work of art or understand the text, 
also leads to some kind of self-discovery or better: self-recognition through 
an encounter with the otherness of what has a claim over us (the work of art, 
a text, etc.):48 
A spectator’s ecstatic self-forgetfulness corresponds to his continuity with 
himself. Precisely that in which one loses oneself as a spectator demands 
that one grasp the continuity of meaning. For it is the truth of our own 
world – the religious and moral world in which we live – that is presented 
before us and in which we recognise ourselves. [.  . .] What rends him from 
himself at the same time gives him back the whole of his being.49 
This self-forgetfulness is more than abandoning all references to practical or 
goal-oriented concerns, although it certainly involves that as well. Through 
the self-forgetfulness we begin to understand our world and ourselves – which 
is why Gadamer rehabilitates the classic idea that knowledge (cognition) is 
ultimately recognition. 
In passing I would like to observe that this kind of self-forgetfulness is not 
necessarily merely intellectual. It can also be interpreted in a broader vein in 
terms of dispossession of will and desire. Neither Gadamer nor Aquinas 
pursued this line of thought – but Meister Eckhart did. Mystical theologians 
such as Eckhart, Ruusbroec, John of the Cross, Ignatius of Loyola, Simone 
Weil, amongst others, have made clear that detachment (or radical 
dispossessiveness of self) enables us to engage with the world in an authentic 
manner. By letting go of our own self-preoccupied concerns we can begin to 
be truly involved with the world as it is. This suggests that there is deep 
congruity between the mystical-theological ideal of detachment, on the one 
hand, and the non-instrumentalist, ‘disinterested’ manner characteristic of the 
aesthetic attitude.50 Both the encounter with art and God involve a kind of 
renunciation of self, which further illustrates that contemplating works of art 
can act as a praeparatio evangelica. 
While it would be incorrect to attribute the language of ‘self-forgetfulness’ 
that Gadamer associates with theoria to Aquinas’s own notion of 
contemplation, his notion of intellectus does have connotations of receptivity 
and openness to reality. In De veritate 15.1 Aquinas contrasts reason and 
intellect as movement relates to rest, and generation to being (esse). It is 
therefore intellectus which enables us to attend to being, to be really present 
to reality. As Pierre Rousselot made clear many years ago in his book 
L’Intellectualisme de Saint Thomas, it is through intellectus that we acquire 
the contemplative openness to what is really real.51 According to Aquinas the 
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word intellectus is derived from reading (legit) the truth within (intus) the very 
essence of things.52 Intellectus thus denotes an openness or receptivity as to 
how things essentially are. Moreover, in light of this notion of intellectus as 
openness towards being we can begin to understand Aquinas’s notion of truth, 
which he defines as adaequatio intellectus et rei. As is well-known, it would 
be a mistake to translate this in terms of correspondence, as if there were two 
parallel tracks, mind and reality, and we can at best hope that the two might 
meet. Such an understanding of truth in terms of correspondence between 
intellect and reality is Cartesian rather than Thomist. A better translation 
would be ‘assimilation’ of intellect and reality. In his Commentary on John, 
18:38 (no. 2365) Aquinas speaks of commensuratio rei ad intellectum, a 
conformity between reality and intellect: on the one hand, things conform to 
the divine intellect, which creates them; on the other hand, our intellect 
conforms to things, when we truly understand them.  
Conclusion 
Contemplation of art can assist us in gaining an understanding of our world 
and ultimately (insofar as this is possible in this world), catching a glimpse of 
God’s splendour. Let us return briefly to the main topic of this book: the 
encounter between art and mystical theology. 
In the last thirty years scholars have questioned whether mysticism is best 
understood in terms of an immediate experience of God (as William James 
proposed in his book The Varieties of Religious Experience).53 We have 
become more sensitive to the fact that our encounter with God is always 
mediated through faith, hope and love, offering us a lens through which we 
may encounter God in liturgical settings, the created world, fellow-humans, 
suffering and art. This shift in perspective – away from a subjectivist-
experientialist interpretation of mystical theology – finds an interesting 
analogy in our appraisal of theories of art, where a similar shift has taken 
place. Simplifying matters we can say that in the nineteenth century aesthetics 
was mainly understood in terms of expressivism or emotivism. Tolstoy’s essay 
‘What is Art?’ has given an eloquent expression of this experientialist or even 
emotivist understanding of art. Basically Tolstoy argued that art is a mere 
medium through which the subjective emotions of the artist are being 
transferred to the listener (reader, spectator). This reduces the work of art to a 
mere channel of feelings. 
In the twentieth century philosophers have distanced themselves from this 
romanticist notion of art and have espoused a more cognitivist approach, 
which considers art in terms of its power to disclose our world and enhance 
our understanding of it.54 It will have become clear that Gadamer, with his 
critique of subjectivist-experientialist understandings of art (Erlebniskunst) 
shares this anti-subjectivist stance, and prefers to see the artwork as an event 
which reveals our world. This anti-modern stance makes a dialogue with pre-
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modern authors, such as Aquinas, an exciting and viable venture. Aquinas was 
writing at a time when aesthetics was still deeply embedded in a metaphysical 
framework and thus concerns itself with the most profound questions of being, 
truth, goodness and beauty. It is for this reason that I have attempted to bring 
Gadamer’s thought on art and theoria into dialogue with Aquinas’s views on 
intellect and contemplation, even though as I admitted earlier, Aquinas says 
little enough about art, and contemplation of art in particular.  
Gadamer mentions a number of characteristics that reveal the ‘event-ful’ 
nature of interpreting art. He describes art in terms of (a) play (pursued for its 
own sake, characterised by an inner to-and-fro dynamic); (b) symbol (as a way 
of integrating our fragmented world); and (c) festivity (its timelessness). These 
three characteristics cohere well with what Aquinas has to say on intellective 
contemplation as (a) leisurely or pursued for its own sake, playful and 
predicated on the on-going dynamic of ratio and intellectus; (b) intuitive and 
integrative; and (c) beyond discursive time. This means that Gadamer’s 
hermeneutical project (including his notion of interpretation in terms of on-
going dialogue) could be enriched by an engagement with Aquinas’s 
anthropology, and his understanding of the dialectic between ratio and 
intellectus in particular. An engagement with the Thomist distinction between 
intellectus and ratio could thus further enhance Gadamer’s attempt to describe 
‘the dialogue that we are’.55 
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